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SAR. SRS-SIGINT File

Approved For Release 2004/12/16 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000600060019-1

20 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Security Center
Office of Security

SUBJECT: Security Handling of Satellite SIGINT

1. On Thursday, 20 September, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance discussed the implementation of the United States Intelligence Board decision on the security handling of satellite SIGINT (see USIB-D-41.5/17) and reached preliminary agreement on how this should be done as far as the KH is concerned. COMOR is postponing final consideration until the reactions of you and your office are available to them.

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2. It would be appreciated if you could be in touch with [redacted] with regard to whether it is appropriate for you to discuss this matter with COMOR next Thursday, 27 September.

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[redacted]
James O. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment: Draft

C/SRS/OSA/DDR:JQReber:bs

Copy 1--C/SSC/OS
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NSA and NRO review(s) completed.

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
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19 September 1962



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
1. Information obtained from satellite SIGINT collection which reveals the source will be in the  System up until the point of publication for distribution to the Intelligence Community. At that time NSA or other authorized processors will place the reports in the KH System. Such reports will be distinguished by the codeword

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PL 86-36

 and will be classified TOP SECRET.



2. All existing T-KH procedures thereupon apply, both with regard to the documentation and the people who may have access to the material on a need-to-know basis. Procedure for approval of additional T-KH billets remains the same.

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3. It is anticipated that in the application of  control to the processing center or centers and in the application of T-KH to the reports published to the Intelligence Community, situations will arise which show the necessity for additional personnel within the processing center to be aware of materials collected by satellite photography or other sensors in order to hold discussions with officials at a broader level than the specific analysis of SIGINT satellite tapes. Logically then these people should be cleared for T-KH.

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4. Foregoing arrangements do not apply to WALNUT and

 formation. 



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